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Katsoulacos 1991). The problem of the optimal prices and locations has been
explicitly solved by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) with a triangular and symmetric
distribution. They show that, given that distribution, any symmetric location
around the middle cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, two asymmetric equilibria
arise, characterized by strong product di¤erentiation between the …rms, with
one of them locating outside the support of the customer distribution.Their
results, however, heavily depend on the non di¤erentiability of the consumers
density function, which generates a discontinuity of the reaction functions in
correspondence of any symmetric location.
In this paper, we aim at extending Tabuchi and Thisse analysis in two di-
rections. We o¤er a simple parametrization of the degree of consumers’ con-
centration around the middle - which include the uniform and the triangular
distribution as limit cases. This allows us to solve the price-location problem
as a function of the degree of consumers concentration. Within this setup, we
are able to show that a symmetric equilibrium exists, provided the density is
di¤erentiable at the center of its support. Moreover, we are able to give some
theoretical support to the idea that a higher concentration of consumers around
the center induces …rms to reduce the optimal product di¤erentiation. Finally,
we …nd that the asymmetric equilibria identi…ed by Tabuchi and Thisse may
arise for a lower degree of consumers concentration than that implied by the
triangular distribution and that these asymmetric equilibria may coexist with a
symmetric one.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic model
and discuss the simple parametrization of consumers’ concentration adopted in
the sequel. The explicit solution of the price-location problem is presented in
section 3. Some comments and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.
2 The model
Let us consider a market for a horizontally di¤erentiated product, where the
population of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumers, indexed with x, are
distributed over the interval [0; 1] ; according to a density f (x;w), where the
parameter w that can be viewed as a concentration index of the consumers’
tastes. More precisely, the density f (x;w) is characterized as follows:
f (x; 1) = 1; for x 2 [0; 1]
f (x; 0) = 2¡ 2 j2x¡ 1j ; for x 2 [0; 1]
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Figure 1: The density function for di¤erent values of the concentration param-
eter
As shown in Figure 1, f (x;w) is symmetric around x = 1=2; for w = 1 it
describes a uniform distribution while, as w decreases it concentrates towards
the middle becoming trapezoidal and collapsing to a triangle for w = 0. Roughly
speaking, our density is a trapezoid, with longest base equal to 1, shortest base
equal to w and altitudo equal to
2
1 + w
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In this framework we consider a duopoly model in which both …rms, …rm
1 and …rm 2, produce a di¤erentiated product at a constant and equal to zero
marginal cost. The location x chosen by each …rm represents the good it de-
cides to produce: the ideal consumer’s product may match with the product
o¤ered, otherwise consumers choose to buy a ”less than ideal” product paying
a transportation cost that we consider quadratic in distance. Each consumer
takes at most one unit of the product, so that total demand for the good o¤ered
by the …rm located in x is given by the number of customers it patronizes. In
the sequel we shall assume full market coverage.
Let us denote with a the distance of …rm 1 from the origin, while b is the
distance of …rm 2. In order to exclude the possibility of leapfrogging by either
…rms we assume a < b - where a 2 (¡1;1) and b 2 (¡1;1) - and marginal
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consumer lying between the two …rms. As is well known, the price-location
problem is a two-stage game in which at the …rst stage the …rms choose their
location and at the second stage choose their prices. The game is simultaneous.
The optimal …rms’ behaviour obviously di¤ers according to the value of w:
The results in terms of optimal locations are well known in the literature when
w = 1 and when w = 0: in the unconstrained Hotelling game with a uniform
distribution of consumers the …rms maximize pro…ts by locating at ¡1=4 e 5=4
(Lambertini, 1994); moreover, Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) demonstrate that with
a triangular distribution two asymmetric equilibria arise,
¡¡p6=9; 5p6=18¢ and¡
1¡ 5p6=18; 1 +p6=9¢. The following analysis will focus on the price-location
equilibria for intermediate values of the parameter w, i.e. when the density
becomes trapezoidal.
3 Consumer concentration and equilibrium prices
and locations
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction, solving
…rst for the prices and then for the locations as a function of the exogenous
parameter w and the optimal prices determined in the …rst stage. Notice that if
…rm 1 and 2 set a price respectively equal to p1 and p2 being located respectively
in a and b, the above hypotheses on transportation costs, unit demand and full
market coverage imply that the marginal consumer’s location is
z =
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¶
(1)
Clearly, given the shape of our density, the …rms’ reaction functions in both
stages of the game will be di¤erent according to the fact that the …rms know that
their behaviour implies that the marginal consumer lies in the ’central interval’
or in the two external intervals, i.e. z 2
·
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- central interval -
or z 2
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and z 2.
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- external interval. We solve the model
under both conjectures and verify under which conditions one or more equilibria
exist in which conjectures are ful…lled. Notice that, given the simmetry of the
density, the possible existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium such that z 2·
0;
1¡w
2
¶
implies the existence of a specular equilibrium, with the marginal
consumer lying in a specular position within the interval
µ
1 +w
2
; 1
¸
. This
allows to restrict the analysis to one external area only.
3.1 The marginal consumer lies in the central interval
Given the hypothesis of unit consumers’ demand and given our normalization,
the market demand for each good corresponds to its market share. Therefore,
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